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Notes
Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional
Law in Egypt:
The Constitutionalization of the
Sharia in a Modem Arab State
In 1980, the Egyptian government decided to amend the
Egyptian Constitution,in order to make Islamic law (sharia)
"the principlesource of Egyptian -legislation." The Supreme
ConstitutionalCourt ofEgypt has recently begun to interpret
and apply this provision. The Author analyzes these decisions, puts them in their historicalcontext, and evaluates
whether this will help ease the tensions between Islamist and
secularistfactions in Egypt. The Court has interpretedthis
clause to mean that allfuture legislationrespects a number
of broadprinciples that it identifies as the "universals," or
'fundamentalprinciples," of the sharia. These principles,
the Court says, are mentioned in the sacred texts of Islam
and have always been accepted as essential premises of
Islamic law. One of the most importantof the fundamental
principles of the law is the principle that no law should
create hardshipfor people. Checking Egyptian legislation
for conformity with the fundamentalprincipleshas so far
turnedout to be an exercise in utilitarianevaluation of the
law.
The Author points out that utilitariantheories of Islamic
law have appearedthroughoutIslamic history and they have
come to be widely embracedin the last one hundredyears.
Nevertheless, this is one of the first times that a utilitarian
theory of Islamic law has been appliedin practice through
the mechanism of a constitution.
The recent decisions reveal some of the problems that can
arisewhen one triesto put a utilitariantheory of Islamic law
into practice. First, the Supreme ConstitutionalCourt has
notyetfully explained how its melding of utilitarianIslamic
legal theory and constitutionaltheoryfits into the tradition
of Islamic legal theories. Second, in identifying and applying fundamental principles, the Supreme Constitutional
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Courthas beenforced to rely on subjectivejudgements. It is
clear, then, that this theory could be abused by a
faction-secularistor Islamist-that took control of the
judiciary. The authorsuggests, therefore, that the Egyptian
court must convincingly display more familiarity with the
Islamic tradition, and it must ground its theories more
explicitly in that tradition. It should also take steps to limit
the judicial discretion that is inherent in its theory as
currently applied
INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years popular movements calling for the imposition
of some form of sharia (Islamic law) have appeared in many Muslim
nations.' Under pressure from such "Islamist" movements,2 many
Muslim nations have been forced to abandon the strict separation of
church and state in order to give some role to sharia.3 These movements have prompted governments of several Muslim countries to
amend their constitutions so that Islamic law has a constitutional role in
their society.4 These amendments, however, are often vaguely worded
1. In this note, the author will occasionally refer to Arabic words. In general, Arabic

words will be italicized. Transliterating from another alphabet is always a tricky process and
involves some compromises. In transliterating these words from the Arabic script, the Journal
has chosen to represent letter qaf with a "q" and kaf with a "k." A reverse apostrophe
represents the letter 'ain,and an apostrophe represents the letter hamza. The aspirated and
unaspirated h's have, however, not been distinguished-each being represented by an "h."
Long and short vowels have also not been distinguished from each other. When referring to
Islamic law (sharia), the Journal has departed from the usual orthography. The word sharia
is spelled without marking the letter 'ain. The spelling sharia has become common in law
reviews in the United States. As such, the Journal feels it has become a technical term rather
than a transliteration. For the same reason, the term sharia is not italicized.
2. The Author uses the term "Islamist" generally to mean one who believes in imposing
Islamic law in society. Islamists differ from each other on many important points of
doctrine-including how to define Islamic law and how to pursue the goal of imposing sharia
(in whatever form) in society. The Author uses the term "radical Islamist" to refer to those
who are willing to impose sharia on society by force.
3. See generallyEMANEL SvAN, RADIcAL ISLAM (1985); Emanuel Sivan, The Islamic
Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back in FUNDAMENTAISMS INCOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
96, 96-108 (Lawrence Kaplan ed., 1992); John 0. Voll, Fundamentalismin the SunniArab
World in FtJNDAMENTALisMS OBSERVED 345, 345-402 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby
eds., 1991); G.H. JANSEN, MINiTrANT ISLAM 121-71 (1979); and Albert Hourani, Conclusion
in ISLAM IN THE PoLmcAL PRocEss 226 (James P. Piscatori ed., 1983).

4. Countries that have constitutionalized Islamic law include Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan,
Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Other governments, such as Libya, while
not going so far as to amend their constitutions, have undertaken to reform their laws so as to
conform to the sharia. As regards the constitutionalization of Islamic law in Pakistan, see
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and difficult to apply. When interpreting constitutional Islamization
clauses, courts have confronted two main problems: (1) developing a
workable definition of sharia, a concept that has had widely divergent
understandings over the centuries, and (2) determining the appropriate
role for constitutional sharia.
In 1980, the Egyptian Government amended Article 2 of the
Egyptian Constitution. The new Article 2 read, "Islamic sharia will be
the principle source of Egyptian legislation." Since then, the courts of
Egypt have been asked to interpret the meaning of this clause. The
courts have been asked to define "Islamic sharia" and to determine what
it means to be "the principal source of legislation."
These questions have fallen primarily to the Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt (SCC), whose interpretation of a constitutional passage
binds all other courts in their own constitutional adjudication. Like the
United States Constitution, the Egyptian Constitution is the supreme
source of law. To help ensure the effective interpretation and administration of the Constitution, the 1971 Constitution established a Supreme
Constitutional Court and endowed it with the power ofjudicial review

generally PAK. CONST. art. 227 (as modified up to 1990). As part of the new wave of
Islamization, the government ofNawaz Sharif adopted the Enforcement of Shariah Act, the
wording ofwhich can be found in Pakistan Affairs, Senate PassesEnforcement ofShariah Bill
1991,44 PAKi AFFAIRs 1, 2-3 (1991). This bill defined the term sharia and reaffrmed it as the
supreme law of Pakistan. See generally Charles Kennedy, Repugnancy to Islam: Who
Decides?, 41 INT'L & COMPARATIVE L. Q. 769, 779-80 (1992); J. Mayer, Islamic Use of
PracticalReason: CaseStudy: Islamizing the Pre-Emption Doctrinein Pakistan, 16 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'LL. REv. 423, 423-425 (1993). For the Constitutionalization of Islamic law in
Qatar, see QATAR CONsT. art. I (PRoviSIONAL CONSTITUTION 1973). See also CIVIL AND
COMIERCIAL CODE OF QATAR, reprinted in 9 COMMERcmLr LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST:
QATAR Qatar-I, 2 (Gamal M. Badr ed., 1989). For Sudan, see SUDAN CONST. art. 4 (SUDAN
TRANSrrIONAL CONSTITUTION 1985). For an analysis, see also Nicholas B. Angell, Islamic
and Western Baning:A Comparisonwith SelectedLegal Issues in 37 SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVATE
ImESTmENTS ABROAD: PROBLEmS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BusINEss 16-1,

16-16

(Carol Holgren ed., Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1994). Saudi Arabia, which does not
formally have a constitution, has passed a Basic Law of Rule, which declares both that the
sharia is binding law and that all legislation repugnant to sharia is unenforceable. See Royal
Decree No. A/90 art. 1, reprintedin 4 BusINEss LAWS OF SAUDI ARABIA 4.1-3, 4.1-4 (Nicola
H. Karam ed., 1998). See also the analysis in David Kultgen, The Effect of IslamicLaw on
InternationalBusiness in 37 SYMPOSIUM ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONSININTERNATIONALBusINESS 15, 1, 15-4-15-6 (Carol Holgren ed., 1994). For the
voluntary decisions of the Kuwaiti and Libyan governments, see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, The
Shari'ah: A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules in ISLAMIC LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE 177, 182 (Nicholas Heer ed., 1990).
5. See DusTuR JUMHURIYYAT MISR AL-'ARABIYYA [Constitution] art. 3, 65
(Egypt)(Sept 11, 1971) [hereinafter DUSTUR]. This is published in Arabic, followed by the
Egyptian Government's official English translation, in CONSTITUnONS OF THE WORLD (Albert
Blaustein & Gilbert Flanz eds., 1991). The official English translation is also published in
HUMAN RIRHTS AND DEMOCRACY 288 (Kevin Boyle & Adel Omar Sherifeds., 1996).
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to guarantee that the basic freedoms granted by the Constitution could
not be violated by the legislative or the executive branches. 6 In essence,
the SCC is a special court that stands outside of the regular court
system. 7 Its only function is to settle open questions of Constitutional
interpretation. 8
Since 1993, a number of Article 2 cases have been referred to the
court. In these cases it has defined the term sharia for the purposes of
Article 2. It has also begun to develop a method which Egyptian courts
must henceforth use to determine whether Egyptian law conforms to the
sharia. Unfortunately, there has been little scholarly attention devoted to
these opinions. There has been, to date, only one short overview of
published SCC Article 2 jurisprudence. 9 Addressing cases up to 1994
only, and failing to explain how the SCC's doctrine relates to other
theories of Islamic law, the author of this study accepts two questionable
notions: one, that the SCC's doctrine will be accepted by Egyptians as
a legitimate approach to interpreting and applying Islamic law; and two,
that the SCC's doctrine will ensure that the law will allow the government to pass progressive legislation. I am slightly less optimistic about
the long-term outlook for the SCC's theory. Thus, this note analyzes
and critiques the theory which the SCC has developed.

6. See id. at 174-78.
7. The Egyptian courts are arranged in a hierarchy of courts from the primary courts to
the highest appeals court, the Court of Cassation. For a detailed description of the Egyptian
court system, see generally COUR DE CASSATION, ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, AN OUTLINE OF
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1972); Adel Omar Sherif, The Origins and Development of the
EgyptianJudicialSystem, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, supranote 5, at 13, 18-19;
CLARK LOMBARDt CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LEGAL ASSISTANCE [CHRLA], INTRODUCnTON

TO THEEGYPTIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (pamphlet printed by CHRLA) 5-6, (1996); and ENID HILL,
MAHKAMA! STUDIEs INTHE EGYPTIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 9-45 (1979).

8. See A. SheriW The Supreme ConstitutionalCourtand Its Role in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
supra note 5, at 37, 38. The early history of constitutional adjudication in Egypt
was also recently described in a paper delivered in 1992 at DePaul University by Abdel
Rahman Nosseir, one of the Justices of the SCC. See Abdel Rahman Nosseir, The Supreme
Constitutional Court and the Protection of Human Rights in Egypt (Nov. 1992) (copy on file
at the offices of the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law). For a more abbreviated history,
See HAIL, supranote 7, at 34.
Whenever a court is faced with a constitutional claim in the course of trying a case, the
court has two options. If it believes that the constitutional law at issue is fundamental, then
it can rule on the issue. However, if a court is unsure as to how to rule on the constitutional
issue (because the proper interpretation or application of the law is unclear), then it has the
option of referring the case to the SCC. Upon such a referral, the SCC must issue an opinion
and may order judgment in line with its decision.
9. Hatem Labib Gabr, InterpretationofArticle 2 of the Constitution in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRACY, supranote 5, at 218.
DEmOCRACY,
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Part I gives the background to the SCC's seminal Article 2
decisions. It examines the debate over Islamization in Egypt which led
to the Amendment of Article 2. It discusses the initial debate regarding
the proper interpretion of Article 2 as amended. Part II of the note
examines the SCC's Article 2 decisions since 1993. In these cases, the
SCC finally defined sharia and developed a methodology by which
Egyptian courts would determine whether Egyptian legislation conformed to the sharia. Section A of this part discusses the difficulties that
courts have in defining sharia. Section B gives an overview of the
SCC's definition and methodology. Section C provides examples of
how the Court's doctrine works in practice by discussing two of the
most important recent Article 2 opinions. Part IIconcludes with a
summary and critique of the SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence to date.

I.

The Amendment of Article 2 and the Questions Raised

The current Constitution of Egypt was adopted by national
referendum in 1971. While the 1971 Constitution was being framed, a
vigorous public debate occurred on the issue of how "Islamic" the new
constitution should be.'" Ultimately, the Constitution contained an
article, Article 2, that made several references to Islam's role in Egyptian
society. Article 2 declared Islam the official religion of the country.
Article 2 also contained a clause that stated "al-shari'aal- islamiyya
masdarunra'isiyunlil-tashri'u,"which is usually translated as "Islamic
sharia is a principal source of Egyptian legislation.""
At first, Article 2 was considered to be a descriptive rather than a
prescriptive provision. While paying homage to Egypt's history as a
predominantly Muslim country, it was not considered to require
Egyptian laws to be rewritten to conform to the sharia. Hence, there
was little attempt to Islamize the laws of Egypt in the 1970's. The
legislature, dominated by a secularist party, did not make any effort to
change the laws to reflect traditional "Islamic" values. Courts never
interpreted Article 2 to require Islamization of the laws.
As the 1970's progressed, however, Islamist movements grew

10. See JANSEN, supra note 3, at 140, citing J.P O'Kane, Islam in the New Egyptian
Constitution in 26 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, 137-48 (Spring 1972).
11. DusTuR, art. 2.
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particularly powerful in Egypt.12 They decried the fact that the government was making no effort to impose the sharia. Some insisted that
Article 2 ofthe Constitution was being misinterpreted and that it should
be read to require immediate reform of the law to make it conform to the
sharia.l3 Others argued that Article 2 could not be interpreted in this
way, but they insisted that the Constitution be amended so as to require
such Islamic reform.
By the late 1970's, the government could no longer afford to ignore
these calls to give sharia a more important role. As a result, the
government was finally forced in 1980 to respond to the concerns of its
growing Muslim opposition by amending its constitution to give Islamic
law a vital role in Egyptian society. The wording of Article 2 of the
Constitution was thus changed from "al-shari'aal-islamiyya masdarun
ra'isiyunlil-tashri'u14 ("Islamic sharia is a principal source of Egyptian
legislation") to the more forceful statement, "al-shari'a al-islamiyyaalmasdaru al-raisiyulil-tashri""' ("Islamic sharia is the principal source
of Egyptian legislation"). 6
The change in the wording of Article 2 transformed the formerly
innocuous clause into a highly controversial and potentially powerful
clause. The act of amending Article 2 had been a concession by the
government to Islamists and it implied that Islamic sharia was henceforth
to have a more important role in Egyptian society. It was, however,
unclear exactly what the new Article 2 meant, or exactly what it
committed the government to do. The dispute over the meaning of
Article 2 centered on two crucial interpretive questions: what did it mean
for sharia to be "the principal source of Egyptian legislation," and what
was the "Islamic sharia?"
First, what does it mean for sharia to be "the principal source of
legislation"? By making Islamic sharia the "principal source" (almasdaral-raisi)of Egyptian legislation, it was unclear whether Article
2 makes sharia the preferred source of legislation, or the source of
legislation which controls all other legislation. Secularists argued that
12. See generallyGIEsKEPEL, MusrIMEXTREMISM IN EGYPT (John Rothschild, trans.,
1993); Fouad Ajami, In the Pharoh's Shadow: Religion andAuthorityin Egypt in ISLAM IN
THEPoLrncALPROCEss, (James P. Piscatori ed., 1983); Voll, supranote 3, at 345-402; P.J.
VATIKOTIS, THE HISTORY OF EGYPT 417-20 ( 3 d ed.

1985).

13. See 'Abd al-Halim Mahmud, Debate on the Application of Shari'ain Egypt, alAbram, May 7, 1976 reprintedin ISLAM INTRANSMON: MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES 241 (John J.
Donahue & John Esposito eds., 1982).
14. DusTuR, art. 2.
15. DusTUR, art. 2 (as amended).
16. HUMAN RiGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, supranote 5, at 288.
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Article 2 made sharia, at most, the preferred form of legislation. Thus,
they said, the legislature should consider the dictates of sharia in enacting
legislation, but it was not bound to follow any particular version of
"Islamic law"-it would be free to modify traditional rules of sharia
whenever the sharia seemed anachronistic or impractical. 7
Islamists, however, interpreted the term "the principal source" (almasdar al-raisi)to mean "the supreme source." Thus, all Egyptian
laws must accord with the laws of the Islamic sharia, and any laws that
contradicted sharia would have to be struck down by judges. This may
seem a strained interpretation in view of the English translation, but it
was not an implausible reading in the Arabic. The term "principal" in the
phrase "principal source" is a rough translation of the Arabic word "alra'is," the adjectival form of the noun ra'is.'8 The rai"isof something
is usually its leader or most important part. A rai'isis often someone
with controlling authority. The ra'isof a republic, for example, is its
president. Consequently, the adjective "al-ra'si"means "most important" and often has a connotation of supreme authority. '" Hence, the
Islamist interpretation of "principal source" is plausible.
Second, regardless of what it meant for sharia to be "the principal
source" of law, what was meant by the term sharia? As we will discuss
in a later section, the term sharia has meant different things to different
people over the years. Muslims generally agreed on vague propositions
such as "the sharia is the law revealed to the Prophet and recorded in the
sacred literature of Islam." There was, however, no consensus on how
one should go about deriving law from the sacred texts, and
consequently there was no consensus on what laws had actually been
revealed to the Prophet. Thus, there was no workable definition of
sharia that was accepted by all Muslims.

17. The secularists said that, in practice, Article 2 left the government of Egypt with
almost complete freedom to legislate as it saw fit. See Bernard Botiveau, Contemporary
ReinterpretationsofIslamic Law: The Case ofEgypt, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW 261 (Mark
S.W. Hoyle ed., 1993), citing 'ABD AL-HAMID METWALLI, AL, SHARIA AL-ISLAMIYYA KA
MASDARAsAsi Li DUSTUR (1975).

18. The word is derived ultimately from the rootR ' S which means the "head" or "top."
The root has figurative meanings as well. The "ras" of a mountain is its summit. More

importantly for the purpose of translating Article 2, the verb ra'sa,which means literally "to
make someone the head," has come to mean "to put one in authority over people." The noun
ra'isderives from this latter meaning.
19. For example, the ra'isof a republic is its president and the rais of an orchestra is its
conductor. Ra'is can have the general connotation of superior, as opposed to the passive form
mar'fis, which means subordinate. Ra'isi literally means "ra'is-like." See H. WERP, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRrrrEN ARABIC 318 (1961); HARIm FARUQI, FARUQI'S LAW
DICTIONARY 171(1986); 3 E.W. LANE, ANARABIC-ENGLISHLEXICON 996 (1961).
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Debates about the meaning of Article 2 as amended erupted first
in the legislature. Before the amendment, the government party had
created a parliamentary commission to examine Egyptian laws in order
to determine whether or not they conformed with sharia.2' Expecting
reform to come from the legislative and executive branches, Islamists
focused their energies on lobbying that body. They did not, at first,
bring many Article 2 challenges to legislation in court. Nor did the
judiciary prove receptive to Article 2 challenges. When faced with
Article 2 challenges, the courts referred the case to the SCC, and the
SCC delayed hearing the Article 2 cases. As long as there was hope of
legislative compromise on the question of Islamicization in Egypt, it
seems, the SCC did not want to become involved.
The
Ultimately, however, the SCC was forced to act.
parliamentary commission repeatedly delayed issuing its reports on the
conformity of Egyptian laws with the sharia and Islamists grew
increasingly frustrated.21 In 1985, the government formally withdrew its
support for the Islamization project and the movement to Islamicize the
laws by legislative compromise stalled. 22 At this point, a group of
Islamists demanded that the judiciary interpret and, if need be, order
compliance with Article 2. Responding to the growing crisis, in 19853
the SCC finally issued opinions in two controversial Article 2 cases.2
To the great frustration of Islamists, the SCC's opinions in these
cases failed to state clearly how Article 2 would be interpreted and
applied by courts. The SCC dismissed the first 1985 case without ever
reaching the Article 2 issue. The case involved a challenge to "Jihan's
law."24 Islamists claimed that the law violated traditional Islamic law,
which was true. The SCC overturned the law without ever reaching the
Article 2 claim. It held that the law had been adopted by an improper

20. See KEPE, supranote 12, at 184 n.13. See also MubarakActs vs. Fundamentalists
in Facts On File World News Digest, Aug. 2, 1985, availablein LExms, News Library, World
News Digest File.
21. See generally KEPEL, supra note 12.
22. See id. at 247-49.
23. See Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Decision of May 4, 1985
(Unconstitutionality of Decree Law No.44), excerpted in Baudoin Dupret, A Propos de la
Constitutionalite de la Sharia, 4 ISLAMIC LAW & Soc'y 90, 92-95 (1997) (citing R.
JACQUEMOND, ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITIONNELLE (1986) [hereinafter
Jihan's Law Case]; Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Decision of May 4, 1985
(Conformity of Art. 226 ofthe Civil Code to the Principles of Islamic law (Sharia)), excerpted
in Dupret, supra note 23, at 92-95 [hereinafter Article 226 case].

24. See Decree Law No. 44 (1979) (Egypt). It was given its nickname because Jihan
Sadat (wife of former president Anwar Sadat) had lobbied publicly for its adoption.
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executive procedure, and therefore was invalid on procedural grounds."
In deciding the second case, the "interest case," the Court
announced the doctrine of the non-retroactivity of Article 2.26 After
examining the legislative history of the amendment, the SCC decided
that Article 2 only required laws passed after 1980 to conform to the
sharia
Since the case involved a challenge to a law that had been

25. See Jihan's Law Case, supranote 23, at 93-95.
26. See Article 226 Case, supra note 23, at 93-95. The facts of the case were as follows:
in the early 1980's, A1-Azhar University, one of the oldest and most influential Islamic
universities in the world, bought some medical supplies for its medical school. A1-Azhar was
late in making payments under the contract and the seller claimed the right to collect interest
of four percent per annum on the outstanding balance. The seller cited Article 226 of the Civil
Code, which specifically permitted creditors to demand this amount from delinquent debtors.
The university responded by bringing a court case in which it claimed that the payment of
interest was contrary to Islamic law. As a result, the university claimed that Article 226
violated Article 2 and should be declared void.
In classical Islamic law, interest payments had been flatly prohibited as a form of riba.
Riba is defined as "a monetary advantage without a countervalue which has been stipulated
in favour of one of the two contracting parties in an exchange of two monetary values." See
JOSEPH SCHACHT, INTRODUCTION To ISLAMic LAW 145 (1964). This seemingly broad
definition actually applies only when the exchange both occurs over a period of time and
involves items of the same species which can be measured or weighed. See id. at 145-49.
This limitation on the broad rule allowed Muslims to structure complex forms of speculative
business partnerships. For an excellent study of this, see generally A. UDovrrcH,
PARTNERSHIP AND PROFIT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM (1970). For a more preliminary summary see
ScHAcHT at 152-59. The definition of riba,however, clearly prohibited a standard contract
providing for a person to contract to take money on one day and to repay the same amount of
money later with interest. Thus, it precludes most modem Western forms of credit
agreements. The sharia also clearly prohibited penalty clauses. In the modem period,
however, the governments of Muslim nations, including Egypt, generally permitted contracts
with interest provisions. Although a few modem Islamic scholars argued that this was
justifiable, many scholars continued to assert that interest-bearing contracts were contrary to
Islamic law. Thus, it was unclear whether Article 226 conformed to sharia.
A primary court declared the law void and the case was quickly referred to the SCC.
The SCC ruled that since Article 2267 of the Commercial Code had been enacted before the
amendment of Article 2 in 1980, it was immune to Article 2 challenges. For a more detailed
history of the case, see Gabr, supranote 9, at 218-19.
27. For an analysis of the court's reasoning, see Gabr, supranote 9, at 219-20. The SCC
concluded that the fiamers of Article 2 had never intended Article 2 to require the legislature
to amend laws that were already in place. Rather, the framers of the amendment had only
wanted to place restrictions on the legislature's ability to pass new legislation that contradicted
the sharia. Many observers were unconvinced by the SCC's conclusion that Article 2 was not
meant to apply retroactively. The Court's decision did not seem to be justified by the passages
that the SCC cited. For example, an expert on the Egyptian legal system called the decision
"a politic ifnot entirely logical conclusion." Howard Stovall, Guidefor ForeignFirmsDoing
Business with Egypt, MIDDLE EAST ExEcuTIvE REP., Feb. 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnewsplus File. For example, the SCC cited passages from the legislative history
that seem to require the legislature to amend all laws in the country in order to ensure
conformity with the sharia, "within a reasonable time." It contained the following statement:
"[The amendment] means that it is imperative to review the laws which were in effect before
the application of the Constitution of 1971 and to amend these laws in such a manner as to
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passed before 1980, the challenge was invalid.
Islamists were frustrated by these rulings and they continued to
bring Article 2 challenges to legislation passed before 1980. Some lower
court judges with Islamist sympathies referred such claims to the
SCC-in essence asking the SCC to overrule itself.2" Nevertheless, the
SCC remained adamant. It reaffirmed the non-retroactivity of the sharia
on twelve separate occasions. 29 Eventually, eight years passed before
the SCC had to decide whether a new law was in conformity with the
dictates of the sharia. And, thus, it was not until this decision that the
SCC defined what it meant for a law to conform to the sharia.

II.
The Court's Article 2 Doctrine since 1993: Defining and
Applying the Sharia.
In 1993, a group of Islamist lawyers finally mounted a viable
challenge to a post-1980 law. Consequently, the SCC was forced to
define sharia and develop a method by which courts could determine
whether Egyptian legislation was in conformity with the sharia. In
deciding the case, the SCC laid down a blueprint for its Article 2
doctrine upon which it has subsequently expanded. Since the 1993
case, the SCC has had to decide five other Article 2 challenges to
legislation.3' Taken together, these cases provide a clear picture of how
make them conform to the principles of Islamic law [But] the change of the entire legal
organization should not be contemplated without giving the law makers an opportunity and a
reasonable period of time, within which to collect all legal materials and amalgamate them."
REPORT OF THE DRAFNG

CoMNirrN

(presented to and approved by the People's Assembly

on September 15, 1981), cited and translatedin Gabr, supra note 9, at 219. These observers
suggest that the decision to interpret Article 2 to be nonretroactive was probably driven as
much by political concerns as it was by textual analysis. Such an interpretation is probably
accurate. Although the SCC was obliged for political reasons to issue a ruling on Article 2,
it clearly did not want to be drawn into the divisive and increasingly violent debate over
Islamization in Egypt. Preoccupied with the political battle against Islamists, the legislature
was not passing a great deal of important new legislation at that time.
28. For a general discussion ofEgyptian judges' occasional use of their power ofjudicial
review to promote Islamist aims, see Botiveau, supranote 17, at 261.
29. See the list of cases and their subject matter in Dupret, supranote 23, at 95-96 n.9.
30. Supreme Constitutional Court ofEgypt, Case No.7, Judicial Year 8 (May 15, 1993),
summarizedin Gabr, supra note 9 [hereinafter Alimony Case].
31. The cases were the following: Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Case No. 29,
Judicial Year 11 (Mar. 26, 1994), translatedin Dupret, supra note 23, at 99-113 [hereinafter
Child Support Case]; Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Case No. 8, Judicial Year 11
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the SCC defines sharia and how it feels courts can measure the
conformity of new legislation with the sharia.
In each of these cases, the SCC has defined sharia, for the
purposes of Article 2, to consist of all laws which conform to the broad
legal principles that were laid down in the Qur'an and which have been
accepted by all Muslim jurists over the years. The Court calls these
principles the "fundamental principles of sharia." Thus, if legislation
does not violate the fundamental principles of Islamic law, it is in
keeping with the sharia and does not violate Article 2. The SCC has also
come up with a skeletal method by which Egyptian judges can identify
these principles and can determine whether Egyptian legislation is in
conformity with them.
The first section of this part discusses the competing definitions
of sharia that have been proposed by Islamic scholars over the years, so
that the SCC's theory can be placed in its proper historical perspective.
The next section gives an overview of both the Court's definition of
sharia and the method by which the SCC has measured conformity with
the sharia. Finally, the last section shows how the Court's method
works in practice by describing two recent Article 2 cases in which the
SCC upheld Egyptian legislation on the grounds that it conformed with
the fundamental principles of the sharia.

A. The Many Competing Definitions of Sharia
Sharia is the technical term for "Islamic law." It is the body of
rules that God revealed to men in the sacred texts of Islam. Muslims
consider obedience to the sharia to be a crucial religious duty.
Historically, however, there has been no unanimity on what the sharia
consists of or on how to define it. The term sharia has meant different
things to different people in different countries, and even within one
country it has meant different things over the centuries. In the 1970's,
when the Amendment of Article 2 was being proposed, Egyptian

GAZETTE (May 18, 1996) [hereinafter Veil Case] (all translations of this case
appearing in the text are the author's own with the assistance of Gasser 'Abd el Razek);
Alimony Case, supranote 30, at 220-23; Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Case No. 35,
Judicial Year 9 (August 15, 1994), summarized in Digest ofSelected Cases in HUMAN RIGHTS
& DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 264; Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, Case No. 6,
Judicial Year 9 (March 18, 1995), summarizedin Digest ofSelected Cases in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 7, at 278 [hereinafter Law No. 136 Case].
OFmcLA.
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thinkers were championing a number of different definitions of sharia, as
well as various methods of determining whether the law was in
conformity with the sharia 3
Muslims tend to agree on certain basic premises about the nature
of the sharia. They agree that sharia is the sum total of God's normative
categorizations of human acts. God has placed every conceivable act in
one of five ethico-legal categories: obligatory (wajib), recommended
(mandub), permissible (mubah), reprehensible (makruh), and forbidden
(haram). Men must strive to determine what acts fit into what
categories and to live their life accordingly.33 An Islamic state is
required to help Muslims lead an appropriate life by commanding the
obligatory acts and prohibiting the forbidden acts.34
Muslim scholars have also generally agreed, at the most basic
level, on the ways in which one should begin to categorize one's actions.
They agree that the legal quality of all acts should be determined
primarily by examining two sources: the Qur'an, which is considered to
be the verbatim record of God's revelation to the Prophet;35 and the
sunna,which is the ancient oral tradition recording the words and deeds

32. For four competing essays from the 1970's by Egyptian intellectuals on the question
of what it meant to impose sharia in a modem state, see the essays by Najib Mahfuz, 'Abd alHalim Mahmud, Zaki Najib Mahmud, and The Islamic (Student) Association of Cairo
University in ISLAM IN TRANSITION, supra note 13, at 238-50.
33. This scheme immediately raises the question of whether an Islamic state must forbid
the acts that God has deemed "reprehensible" or whether it is enough to forbid the acts that
are deemed to be forbidden. As a practical matter, however, scholars of Islamic law have
generally agreed that the Islamic state would generally not have to punish the commission of
reprehensible acts, nor would it have to reward the commission of recommended acts.
Scholars generally defined four different categories of acts. Obligatory acts were acts whose
commission was to be rewarded and whose bmission was to be punished. Recommended acts
were acts whose commission was rewarded, but whose omission was not to be punished.
Forbidden acts were acts whose omission was rewarded and whose commission was punished.
Permissible acts were acts whose omission was neither rewarded nor punished and whose

commission was neither rewarded or punished. See WArL B. HALAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC
LEGAL THEORiES 40-42 (1997).
34. Most scholars stated that the state could punish people who failed to carry out acts,
but God was the only person who could reward them (through good fortune or in the afterlife).
Therefore, they consider the category "forbidden" to apply to those evil acts that God expects
the state to prohibit, whereas the category reprehensible applies to evil acts whose commission
will be punished by God. See BERNARD WIss, THE SEARcH FOR GOD'S LAW: IsLAMIc
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE WRITINGS OF SAYF AL-DN AL-AMIDI 3-5 (1992). Other theorists,
however, thought that all categorizations should be considered to have "legal" significance in
an Islamic state. Thus the state should, if possible, pass laws that reflected God's
categorization of all acts. Presumably, they would come up with some way to reward people
who performed recommended acts. See Wilfred Madelung, The Searchfor God's Law, 4
ISLAMIC L. & SoC'Y, 122, 122-123 (1997) (book review).
35. See, e.g., JOHNL. EsPosrro, ILAM: THE STRAiGHT PATH 20-21 (1988).
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of the Prophet.36 Furthermore, almost all scholars have agreed on the
doctrine of consensus Qjma)-the doctrine that the unanimous
agreement of all scholars as to how to categorize an act is a miraculous
sign. Thus, whenever all jurists of a particular time agree on a legal
conclusion, one can be absolutely sure that the conclusion is correct.
By critically analyzing the texts and the consensus of the jurists, one can
identify timeless rules that all Muslims must follow. By using analogical
reasoning (qiyas), one can determine the legality of acts even when they
are not clearly announced in sacred texts or validated by Ujma. Analysis
of the law, therefore, requires deep familiarity with the Qur'an, sunna,
opinions of legal scholars, and rules of analogical reasoning.
However, these basic points of agreement quickly give way to
innumerable disagreements. Islamic scholars disagree as to the
appropriate way to analyze the Qur'an, sunna and ijma in order to
discover the rules of sharia.38 They thus group themselves into
competing schools defined by their different methods of deriving rules
from the dictates ofthe Qur'an and the example of the Prophet. Because
they use different ways of deriving and expanding God's law, the
competing schools ultimately have ended up with different rules and
regulations. Each champions its own rules as the true rules of sharia.39
Of the competing schools, the most important, historically, have
been four legal schools which dominated the Islamic world up to the

36. See generallySunna in THE SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 522 (H.A.R. Gibb &

J.H. Kramers eds., 1953); Hadith in id. at 122-123; IGNAz GOLDzHER INTRODUCTION TO
ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 37-47 (Andreas & Ruth Hamori trans., 1981); HALLAQ, supra
note 33, at 10-21.
37. See George F. Hourani, The Basis ofAuthority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam in 21
STUDIAISLAMICA 13 (1964); GOLDZIHER, supra note 36, at 50-52 ; HALLAQ supranote 33,
at 75-8 1; N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 77-80 (1964).
38. Legal theory in Islam is referred to as "usul al-fiqh" (literally "the sources of legal
understanding"). It is conceived of as the science of determining laws from the revealed
sources of God's will. It is a standard course in traditional Muslim religious education. See
THE SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 36, at 611-15. For a survey of some of
the different approaches to deriving law from the Qur'an, sunna and ijma, see generally WAEL
B. HALLAQ, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN CLASSCIAL AND MEDIEVAL ISLAM (1995).
39. One might naturally wonder how the Islamic tradition has reconciled itself to the
plethora of competing versions of sharia without lapsing into a disruptive sectarianism. It has
done so by adopting a dogma of principled agnosticism. Since one can never know for certain
which interpretation of sharia is correct and which is incorrect, God will reward anyone who
follows an incorrect school so long as he does so in good faith. By means of this doctrine of
mutual orthodoxy, the Islamic tradition has allowed for the peaceful coexistence of competing
schools. See SCHAcHr, supranote 26 at 67; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islamic Law in ILAM: THE
RELIGIOUS AND POLriCAL LHE OF A WORLD Co~MMNrrY 233 (Marjorie Kelly ed., 1984).
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modem period. 40 Rulers in most countries adopted one or another of
these schools as the official version of Islamic law. Even though Islamic
law was disestablished in most Muslim nations in the nineteenth century,
most Muslims have continued to be associated with the particular school
that has historically dominated their region. 4' The Hanafi school claims
the nominal allegiance of 60 percent of all Muslims in the
world-including most Egyptians.42 Egypt's family laws continue to be
based primarily on the laws of the Hanafi school.
The four dominant schools came to be known widely as the four
"orthodox" schools of law. This is, however, a misleading name. In
Islam there is no centralized religious office that has the power to
anathematize. Thus, despite the occasional attempts of mainstream
Muslim legal scholars to describe their opponents as "heretics," none of
these schools should be labeled "unorthodox." This is especially true
when we talk about the modem period, since, as we will see shortly, the
basic approach of the untraditional schools is becoming the norm among
Islamists. It is more appropriate to say that schools which opposed the
four dominant schools are "untraditional." Accordingly, I will refer to
the "orthodox" schools as the "traditional" schools in this note.
The scholars of the traditional schools all teach that by analyzing
the Qur'an, sunna and ijma one can identify very specific rules of
behavior that are meant to bind all Muslims at all times and in all places.
"Islamic laws" are generally derived by narrow analogy to these
immutable and rules. The four traditional schools disagree with each
other on the types of hermeneutic tools which can be used to interpret

40. See SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 57-68; Mayer, supranote 39 at 233. Each school
was identified by its nominal obedience to the teachings of a legal figure from the second
century after the death ofthe Prophet The schools were in constant dialogue. As they became
increasingly sophisticated in the third, fourth and fifth centuries of the Muslim era, they grew
to share many basic premises as to the proper way to derive law, and they recognized each
other as mutually orthodox. However, because they still disagreed with each other on
significant points, they retained a separate identity and Muslims were generally expected to
ally themselves with one or another of the schools. See SCHACHT, supra note 26, at 28 n.l.
41. One should recognize that adopting the law of a school did not necessarily mean
adopting a code of law. Schools were identified by their methodology, and a scholar trained
in the methodology of any school could derive laws de novo from the Qur'an, sunna and ijma
so as to come up with a new interpretation of the law. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 4, at 185.
Nevertheless, the methods of the schools limited to a great extent the range of possible
interpretation. Furthermore, scholars in each of the schools eventually began to use the rules
laid down by the luminaries of their school as binding precedents (a process known as taqlid).
Thus, to adopt a school often had the practical effect of adopting a code of rules that acted as
binding precedent. See id. at 183.
42. See Mayer, IslamicLaw, supra note 40, at 233.

1998]

ISLAMIC LA W

the Qur'an and sunna' Thus, they naturally arrive at different rules of
sharia." Indeed, a famous scholar of Islamic law, Ignaz Goldziher,
pointed out at the turn of the century, "there is hardly a topic in
jurisprudence in which no4 5differences of opinion appear among the
various orthodox schools.

Untraditional schools, and even a few iconoclastic scholars
within the traditional schools, have challenged some of the basic
assumptions of the four traditional schools. 6 One particular strain of
untraditional thought deserves particular attention, because it comes to
influence the SCC. According to this line of thought, the analysis of the
Qur'an and sunna does not lead to the discovery of specific rules of
behavior. Instead, it leads to the discovery of broad legal and ethical
principles rather than specific rules of behavior. One derives Islamic law
by coming up with laws that conform to all of the basic sharia principles.
This particular strain of "untraditional" Islamic legal thought has
strongly influenced modem Islamic thinkers and has clearly influenced
the legal theory of both Islamists and the SCC. Its seeds are found in the
Mutazilite school, which died out in the eleventh century.47 Mutazilite
ideas lay dormant for several centuries,4" but they were revived and
developed in a novel way by the iconoclastic Maliki scholar al-Shatibi in
the fourteenth century. ' On Shatibi's death, however, the tradition
lapsed again," only to re-emerge anew in the late nineteenth century
when modernist thinkers such as Rashid Rida proposed "neo-Mutazilite"

43. See SCHACHT, supranote 26, at 67; Mayer, IslamicLaw, supranote 39, at 231-32.
In the Islamic world a whole body of literature known as the ikhtilafliterature was devoted to
enumerating the differences between the schools of law (and between the scholars within a
school). See THE SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 36, at 161-62.
44. See GoLDmzu , supra note 36, at 47-50. For a detailed historical survey of the
schools ofIslamic jurisprudence and their methodologies, see generally HALLAQ, supranote
33. For more specific reading, one can refer to the excellent bibliography in that work.
45. GoLDzHER, supra note 36, at 54.
46. See, for example, the discussion of the Zahiri school in IGNAz GOLDZum , TBE
ZAHmIs: THEIR DOCTRNE AND HISTORY (Wolfgang Behn, ed., 1971).
47. See WEISS, supra note 34, at 84-93; Barbara J. Metzger, Revelation andReason: A
Dynamic Tension in Islamic Arbitrament, 11 J.L. & REuGION 697, 710-712 (1994-95).
48. See HALLAQ, supranote 43, at 136.
49. The SCC uses vocabulary and concepts that are remarkably similar to Shatibi's. In
particular, its discussion of how the sharia pursues certain goals (maqasid), including the
development of morality and the betterment of society, and its emphasis on the fact that God
will make no law too onerous for fear that humans will then turn away from the laws, are both
ideas that were discussed at length by al-Shatibi.
50. For a detailed analysis of Shatibi's theories, see generally HALLAQ, supra note 43,
at 162-206, especially pages 164-68 and 181-83.
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theories of law." Since the rise of neo-Mutazilism, a number of
influential thinkers have proposed legal theories based on the notion that
the sharia is a body of principles to be applied, rather than a large body
of specific, timeless rules to be enforced. This line of thinking was
pursued by some Western-trained modernists such as Mahmassani.5 z It
was also implicitly embraced by the extremely influential radical Islamist
Sayyid Qutb in his work SocialJustice in Islam. 3 It has been pursued
also by the liberal Egyptian intellectual Sa'id Asmawy 4
Different modem thinkers have developed this type of theory in
different ways. Since Rida, however, there has been particular interest
in the notion that obedience to the divinely-revealed principles of sharia
leads inevitably to certain divinely-favored social outcomes, such as
social justice, chastity, and democracy. If one accepts such an axiom,
one can determine whether laws conform to the principles of sharia by
determining whether the laws lead to the divinely-favored social ends.
Theories based on this axiom have been criticized as simplistic. Critics
have also complained that such theories lead inherently to subjectivism
in the law." Nevertheless, the idea that Islamic laws are laws that
advance certain divinely-ordained social goals has proved extremely
influential.
The SCC has fashioned its own version of the theory that the
sharia should be conceived of as the application of general principles that
function to advance certain divinely-favored social outcomes. Adding
an innovation of its own, the SCC insists that interpreters of Islamic law
need not be classically-trained legal scholars. According to the Court,
civil judges, many of whom are not experts in Islamic law, are also
capable of performing the analyses necessary to derive and apply the
principles that lie at the heart of the sharia.

51. See Caspar, Le Renouveau du Mo'tazilisme, in MELAGES 141, 157-72 (1957);
HALLAQ supra note 33, at 214-20.
52. See Subhi Mahmasani, Muslims: Decadence and Renaissance,44 MusuM WORD
186, 186-91, reprintedin ISLAM IN TRAI.soN, supra note 13, at 181-87. It was also

embraced by the extremely influential radical Islamist Sayyid Qutb in his work SocIAL JUS

E

iN ISLAM, (John Hardle trans., 1970), reprintedin ISLAM INTRANsrrtoN, supra note 13.
53. See QuTB, supranote 52, at 123-28. Note particularly pages 124-25.
54. See the discussion of Ashmawy in HALLAQ, supra note 33, at 231-41.
55. See, e.g., the criticism of Rashid Rida's religious utilitarianism in HAI.LAQ, supra
note 33, at 219-20. See also the criticism of Hassan Turabi in HALLAQ, supra, at 229-31, and
in Fazlur Rahman, Towards Reformulating the Methodology of Islamic Law, 12 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1979). See also the criticism of Sa'id Ashmawi in HAILAQ, supra, at

241.
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B. An Overview of the SCC's Article 2 Jurisprudence since 1993
In 1993, the SCC first defined what it meant for legislation to
conform with sharia as required by Article 2. Islamic law is any law
which conforms to certain divinely revealed principles that function to
advance social goals favored by a compassionate God. These are
"universals,"or, as I will refer to them, "fundamental principles" of the
sharia. According to the Court, these fundamental principles are laid
down in the Qur'an and have been accepted, at least implicitly, by all
schools of Islamic law over the years, although they have been applied
differently in different places to come up with Islamic laws appropriate
for their particular time and place. 6 According to the SCC, the various
schools of sharia have proposed many competing rules of sharia over the
years. Nonetheless, despite their many differences, none of the
competing rules ever conflicts with the fundamental principles. Thus, the
various schools are bound only by common respect for these
fundamental principles. For all practical purposes, respect for these
principles defines "Islamic law." Therefore, laws of the Egyptian
government will conform to the sharia so long as they too respect these
fundamental principles. This section will describe the SCC's definition
of sharia and will show the methodology which the SCC has adopted to
determine whether a modem law conforms to the general principles of
sharia.

1. The SCC's Definition of Sharia
The SCC's model of Islamic law distinguishes between the
fundamental principles of Islamic law and the rules of Islamic law that
scholars have proposed over the years. According to the SCC, God
revealed a number of broad legal principles to the Prophet in the Qur'an.
Coopting a concept from traditional Islamic legal theory, the SCC refers
to these principles as the principles on which "Ujtihad is forbidden"
which, in this context, means more or less that Muslims must accept
them without question. Respect for these principles for all practical
purposes defines "Islamic law." These principles are the essence of the

56. See Alimony Case, supra note 30.
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sharia, and Muslims may never pass any laws that violate them.
... [A]cts of legislation cannot violate those rules of the
sharia whose meaning and immutability has been
definitively established, that is to say on those rules of
sharia on which iftihad is forbidden. These fixed,
immutable rules of the sharia represent the general
principles and established roots
of Islam and they cannot
57
be interpreted or replaced.
These principles are extremely broad and can be applied in any
number of ways. It is unclear whether the SCC believes that at one
particular time and place, only one body of laws will simultaneously
conform to all the principles. From the tone of the SCC's decisions, it
would seem not. However, it is clear that at different times and different
places different laws will conform to the same principles. Thus, different
Muslim societies will be governed by different bodies of law, each
respecting the same fundamental principles.
Based on the SCC's use of the sunna literature, one can conclude
that the Court takes the following view of the history of the development
of Islamic law. The first time that Muslims applied the fundamental
principles to legal questions in order to come up with "Islamic law"
occurred when the Prophet himself created laws for the first Muslim
community. These laws represent an infallible interpretation of how best
to apply those principles to the circumstances which the Prophet
encountered in his seventh century C.E. Arabian community. Later
communities were not required to obey the same specific rules that
governed the Prophetic community.58 Rather, they were obliged only to
obey the same fundamental principles that lay beneath the rules. Indeed,
obeying the fundamental principles required later scholars not to follow
the same rules as the Prophet. One of the fundamental principles was

57. Veil Case, supra note 31, at 1030.
58. The SCC seems to hedge in its opinions on the question of whether later Muslims
must follow the laws laid down by the Prophet for his own community. In some cases, it does
not even examine the sunna literature to see how the Prophet interpreted a fundamental
principle ofthe law. See, e.g., Child Support Case, supranote 31. In others it claims that the
sunna literature is on par with the Qux'an as a textual source in which one must look for
fundamental principles of the law. See, e.g., Veil Case, supranote 31. The implication in its
most recent cases is that the Prophet may specifically announce a general principle of the
sharia, but that barring such a statement, one must assume that the actual rules the Prophet

laid down for his community represent the application of an unstated general principle.
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that the law should not harm Muslims. Since the needs of Muslims
changed in different times and places, different laws were necessaryto
meet the different needs of Muslims. The competing schools of sharia
are the natural consequence of the process of applying the immutable,
fundamental principles of society in different societies. 9
The implications of the Court's theory are clear. Any law that
respects all of the broad, fundamental principles of Islamic law is
acceptable Islamic law. As the SCC puts it, such a law represents a
subsidiary rule of sharia. Article 2 requires only that the government of
Egypt resyect
the broad Qur'anic principles on which itihad is
°
forbidden.
In many ways, this theory seems consistent with the theories of
influential Islamists such as Qutb. One point, however, should be
emphasized. While many Islarnists have embraced a theory similar to the
SCC's, Islamists insist that only professional scholars of Islamic law
may have the final authority when it comes to identifying and applying
the fundamental principles of law. The SCC, however, states that since
Article 2 is a constitutional provision, the judges in the national courts
must perform the necessary Article 2 analyses, and the SCC must have
the final authority to decide issues of sharia law for the purposes of
Article 2. The SCC has thus tried to develop a method by which the
national courts can determine whether new legislation respects the
sharia.

2. The Court's Method of Determining Whether Legislation
Respects the Fundamental Precepts of the Sharia
The SCC has developed a two-step methodology to evaluate
whether an Egyptian law conforms to the fundamental principles of
sharia. First, the relevant fundamental principles of sharia are identified.
Second, the SCC determines whether the law violates any of these
fundamental principles. To determine whether the new legislation
violates the identified principles the Court goes through another twostep process. First, it asks what social goals the legislation promotes.
Then it determines whether the Egyptian law promotes or hinders that
goal.

59. See, e.g., Veil Case, supra note 31, at 1033.
60. See, e.g., Veil Case, supra note 31, at 1031.
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In the first step, therefore, the Court identifies fundamental
principles by examining the Qur'an, the sunna literature, and the rules of
the classical schools. According to the SCC, fundamental principles
have invariably been laid down in an explicit passage of the Qur'an or a
special type of sunna literature." The Court comes up with an
interpretation of the Qur'anbased on the "plain meaning" of the text.
Based on this plain meanifig interpretation, the Court identifies a
fundamental principle of Islam. The Court then checks its interpretation
by examining the legal rules of sharia proposed by the various legal
schools. The SCC does not discuss all legal schools; rather, it generally
examines the opinions of a few, focusing on the opinions of the four
traditional schools. If it finds that the rules of the schools are in harmony
with this principle, then the principle must indeed be a fundamental
principle of sharia.
It is difficult, for judges not trained in exegesis of the Qur'an or
sunna, to convincingly identify legal principles in these notoriously
opaque texts. As noted above, Muslim legal scholars have traditionally
undergone a great deal of training in order to draw meaning from the
texts. 2 Extensive training in traditional religious hermeneutics is not a
part of the standard legal coursework in Egyptian universities, a fact
about which Islamists have complained.
The SCC's methodology, I believe, may be designed to
circumvent the problem ofjudges' lack of training in traditional Islamic
law. The SCC never explains why it selected this particular method.
One can speculate, however, that it is designed to ground the
interpretation of the Court in the interpretations that were carried out by
the highly trained jurists ofthe medieval period. The Court reasons that
the scholars of the schools have been trained in all the hermeneutics of
Qur'an and sunna. If they, with all their training, have consistently
agreed on a particular legal principle, then one can be sure that the
Qur'an and sunna require obedience to this principle. If they do not all
agree on the principle, then one can be sure that the Qur'an and sunna
do not explictly state such a principle. Thus, if there is any doubt as to
61. See Child Support Case, supra note 31, at 107.
62. They have studied the historical context of the Qur'anic verses (asbabal-nuzul), the
doctrine ofabrogation (naskh), and the competing interpretations of Qur'anic passages (tafsir).
They also engage in extremely detailed studies of classical Arabic grammar and philology.
Analysis of the sunna has also traditionally required extensive training, including, again, in

grammar, philology, and hermeneutics. Furthermore, some insist that one must be familiar
with the complex science of hadith criticism to interpret the sunna. Generally, the traditions
which are recorded in the sunna are not all considered of equal authenticity. Islamic legal
scholars are expected to be able to assess the quality of a tradition, so that they can discount
it if need be.
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whether a particular principle is or is not a fundamental principle of the
Qur'an, a court can check its interpretation of the Qur'an and/or sunna
by finding out whether all of the scholars agreed on the principle.63
This methodology inevitably results in the identification of very
broad general principles. Only the broadest principles are both
mentioned in the Qur'an and accepted by all schools.64 The SCC itself
recognizes that the principles that meet the criteria required of
fundamental principles are inevitably extremely general; as it concludes
in one of its most recent cases, "In refining the human soul and
straightening the individual person, the Islamic sharia65 only decrees
general provisions which are the framework for belief.,
Having proposed a method by which judges can identify broad
fundamental principles, the Court next proposes a two-step method by
which courts can determine if laws accord with these fundamental
principles. It does this by first asking what social goals the fundamental
principles serve. According to the SCC, every fundamental principle
promotes a different divinely-ordained goal. The Court then performs
a balancing test, asking whether a particular law promotes or hinders
these social goals. Evaluation of legislation for conformity with sharia
thus rests in part upon speculative assumptions about the results of laws
or on subjective policy judgments. In this way, the SCC takes a
utilitarian approach to evaluating conformity with the fundamental
principles of sharia.
The SCC has not held that judges are theoretically required to
show any deference to other branches' interpretations of the
Constitution. Furthermore, it has not given strict guidelines as to how
a court should perform its balancing test or what types of evidence it
should consider when determining the probable outcome of a law. This
methodology leaves judges an extraordinary amount of discretion to
uphold or strike down legislation on the basis of their own subjective
policy assumptions.
The SCC has thus far consistently exercised its discretion in favor
of progressive liberalism. It has upheld legislation in five of the six

63. See, e.g., the discussion in the Child Support Case, supra note 31, at 109-10.
64. As noted above, even the four traditional schools disagree on a wide range of legal

issues. But the SCC will accept only principles that have been unanimously adopted not only
by the traditional schools, but by untraditional schools as well. Indeed, in its first Article 2
opinion, the SCC cited the opinions of the Zahiri school in order to prove that there was a
difference of opinion on a particular point See Alimony Case, supranote 30, at 22. Note that
the translator, using a different transliteration, spells the school's name "Zahereia."
65. Veil Case, supra note 31, at 1034.
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cases. In the one case in which it has struck down legislation, the
legislation was found to violate several provisions of the Constitution.
C. Article 2 Doctrine in Action: Two Cases
The method by which the SCC defines and applies the
fundamental principles of sharia can be understood best by examining the
disposition of actual Article 2 cases. An analysis of all the cases is not
needed to understand the SCC's current Article 2 doctrine, its
advantages, and some of its problems. The analysis and language in all
six cases are consistent, even repetitive. Thus, in this section I will
discuss two of the most important cases: 66 the 1994 Child Support
Case67 and the 1996 Veil Case.68
Both cases are typical ofthe SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence since
1993. In them, the SCC outlines a coherent definition of sharia as laws
that conform to the fundamental principles of sharia. After identifying
these fundamental principles of sharia on the basis of a superficial
reading of the Qur'an and sunna and a thinly-researched examination of
the positions of various legal schools. Having identified several
fundamental principles, the SCC then analyzes whether the legislation at
issue is consistent with these principles. After identifying the social ends
to which the principles lead, the Court then examines whether the
legislation at issue promotes or hinders the desired ends. In these two
cases, as in all the other cases, the SCC ultimately decides that the
legislation in question does indeed conform to the fundamental precepts
of sharia and thus is constitutional under Article 2.
1. The 1994 Child Support Case
The 1994 case involved a challenge to Egyptian family law, in
particular to the law which allows "retroactive" awards of child support.
66. Out ofthe five, I have selected these two for the following reasons. The 1994 Child
Support Case has been translated in its entirety into French. See Dupret, supra note 31.

Readers proficient in French will be able to evaluate and expand upon my analysis without
having to rely solely on this article. The second case examined, the 1996 Veil Case, is one of
the most recent cases on the subject, and it makes some refinements on earlier Article 2
doctrines. It has not been analyzed in any published literature to date. I have translated it in
its entirety and I hope to publish this translation in the near future.
67. See Child Support Case, supranote 31.
68. See Veil Case, supranote 31.
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The plaintiff was a father who had divorced his wife in the 1970's.
Following the divorce, the mother supported the child alone without
ever seeking a court order of support from the father. After the son was
grown, however, the mother asked a court to order the father to
reimburse her for the costs of the child's support. The court obliged,
citing a 1985 law that allowed courts to order such retroactive awards.
The father refused to pay. He argued that Egyptians have
traditionally followed the Hanafi school of sharia, which prohibits courts
from ordering retroactive child support. The Hanafis, like almost all
other schools of sharia, believe that a man is always under a moral
obligation to provide for his minor children-even if they do not live
with him. He is not, however, legally obliged to provide such support
until a court orders such support. Furthermore, if other people choose
to feed and clothe his children before the court orders him to support
them, he is under a moral obligation but not under any legal obligation
to repay them.69 Therefore, since Article 2 prohibits the legislature from
adopting a law that was contrary to sharia, it prohibited them from
passing legislation which contradicted laws of the Hanafi school.7" The
case was ultimately referred to the SCC, which rejected the father's
claim. The SCC held that the legislature can pass any law so long as the
law does not conflict with the fundamental principles of sharia, but the
order to pay "retroactive" child support did not violate any of the
fundamental principles.
To reach that decision, the SCC followed the methodology
outlined in the previous section. Since the plaintiff was challenging a law
that permitted retroactive awards of child support, the SCC examined
first whether there was any fundamental principle of sharia dealing
specificallywith the question of whether a court could order retroactive
child support. Fundamental principles of the sharia are both laid down
in the Qur'an and accepted by all the schools. Looking to the Qur'an,
the Court did not find any specific rules on the subject of retroactive
awards of support that have been mentioned in an unambiguous passage
of the Qur'an.7 Since the SCC failed to find any other passage of the
Qur'an that specifically addressed this question, it felt confident in
concluding that no fundamental rule of sharia specifically barred courts

69. The court accepts this as a legislative fact. See Child Support Case, supra note 31,
at 101-02. It is, in fact true; see the handbook of the great classical legal scholar, al-Quduri.
See al-Quduri, translatedandpublished in 2 G.H. BOUSQUET, ABREGt DE LA MUSUIMANE
SELON LE RrrF DE L'IAMMALK 74-77 (1958).
70. See Child Support Case, supranote 31, at 101-02.
71. See Child Support Case, supra,note 31, at 107.
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from ordering retroactive awards of child support. 72 Peculiarly, the
SCC did not discuss whether any evidence of a fundamental rule could
be discerned in the sunna. As noted above, Muslim scholars are almost
unanimous in claiming that at least some passages in the sunna are
capable of providing evidence of specific rules or fundamental principles.
Moreover, as we will see in the analysis of the Veil Case which follows,
the SCC itself began to look to the sunna in later cases.
To confirm its tentative conclusion that no fundamental principle
in the Qur'an specifically barred retroactive child support, the SCC
examined the opinions of the various schools of law to see whether they
agreed unanimously on a rule barring retroactive child support. The
SCC claimed, without citation, that the Maliki school of law allowed
judges to order a father to pay child support retroactively-even if the
father had never at any previous point been ordered by a court to pay
support.' It did not discuss the reasons why the Malikis held this rule,
nor did it look to the rules of other schools to see whether they agreed
on some approach to the question. The fact that there was some
disagreement on the specific question of retroactive child support proved
definitively that no fundamental principle specifically prohibited courts
from ordering retroactive child support.
Even if there was no fundamental principle of sharia that
specifically barred retroactive orders of child support, it was possible
that the retroactive grant of child support would violate some broader
legal principle in the Qur'an. The SCC thus looked to see whether there
were any broad, fundamental principles of the Qur'an that might be
relevant to the question of whether retroactive awards of child support
were permissible. On the basis of a somewhat cursory analysis, the SCC
identified two relevant principles of sharia as relevant: the principle that
fathers should support their children when possible and the principle that

72. See id. at 106-107: "Attendu qu'il n'y a pas 1U de texte absolu qui fixe une r6gle

p6remptoire (f___il) en matire d'autorisation octroyant a l'enfant une pension alimentaire pour
la pdriode ant~rieure non rduite. D6s lors, la vole du raisonnement interprdtatif est, dans ce
contexte, ouverte." It should be noted here that, inexplicably, the SCC did not also examine
the traditions of the Prophet's life (sunna). As discussed above, the sunna has traditionally
been considered a source ofauthoritative knowledge about the sharia. In later cases, the SCC
did look to the sunna as a source of sharia.
73. See id. at 112-113. In fact, this is not exactly the doctrine found in the great
textbook of Khalil Ben Ishaq al-Mukkhtassar, the most influential of the later Maliki
textbooks. See KHAuL BEN ISHAQ, AL-MUKKHTASSAR, translated and published in
BOUsQUET, supranote 69, at 137-38. According to Khalil, a father can not be ordered to pay
for the child's past support except in the exceptional circumstance that a third party has
supported the child without meaning its support to be considered a gift. Nevertheless, in the
child support case the court insists that this difference of opinion is significant. See Child
Support Case, supranote 31, at 112-13.
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no law should create burdens for society.
First, the SCC identified the general principle that fathers should
support their children as "fundamental." Its evidence came almost
entirely from its analysis of Qur'an verse 2:233. "The duty of clothing
the nursing mother in a seemly manner is upon the father of the child .
... A mother should not be made to suffer because of her child."'74 The
second principle which the SCC declared to be "fundamental" is the
vague principle that no law should create hardship for people. The SCC
derived this principle from an interpretation of Qur'an verse 5:6, "God
would not place a burden on you."" One should note that the SCC
never confirms that the principles that it identifies have been recognized
either by the Prophet in the sunna literature or by any other schools of
sharia.'
Having identified two relevant fundamental principles of sharia,
the SCC examined whether the Egyptian law permitting retroactive child
support violated either of them. As for the principle that fathers should
support their children, the SCC stated that the order of retroactive child
support does not conflict with the sharia's command that fathers provide
for their children. Next, the SCC examined whether the award of
retroactive child support was unconscionably burdensome for society.
This is, of course, a very difficult principle to apply: One can measure
hardship in any number of ways. Furthermore, it is difficult to say when
even an extreme hardship is unjustifiable. For example, a law may create
one hardship but avoid another, worse hardship.
Essentially, the SCC seemed to measure the pain that the
Egyptian legislation would cause against the pleasure that it would bring.

74. Child Support Case, supranote 31, at 110. From this verse, the SCC concludes that
the general principle that fathers who are not themselves destitute should pay for the upkeep
of their children is "one of the most excellent objectives of the sharia, one of its most noble
goals." Id. at 110-11.
75. Id. at 75. Arabic text of the whole verse in YusuFAU, THE HOLY QUR'AN: TExT,
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 247-48 (A Yusuftrans., 1983). Translation in MOHAMMED
MARMADUKE PICKTHALL, TiE MEANiNG OF TBE GLoRrous KoRAN 97 (15th prtg.).
76. Conversely, one might add, the SCC uses an unelaborated interpretation of the
Qur'an to reject the legal principle that many schools use to justify a prohibition on retroactive
orders of child support. Those schools of law that prohibit retroactive child support do so on
the basis of two general legal principles: 1) one has no obligation to provide for children who
are not in need; and 2) one should assume that people who are truly in need will assert their
legitimate claims for maintenance in court as soon as possible. See AL-QuDURI, ALMuKn-rAssAR,partially translatedin G.H. BOUSQET & L. BERcHER, LE STATUT PERSONNEL
ENDROrrMUSUMANHANtF=T 66 n.48 (1952). The schools argue that if a child or child's
guardian does not assert a claim to maintenance in court, the child obviously does not need
maintenance. The Court specifically rejects these principles on the grounds that there is no
Qur'anic support for them. See Child Support Case, supranote 31, at 112-13.
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However, it performed its analysis in an unmethodical way, and it is hard
to understand how the public could have much confidence in this
conclusion. In performing its analysis, the SCC never analyzed whether
the law which allowed the retroactive award of child support might be
burdensome (for example, to parents who were suddenly faced with
unexpected debts). Rather, it merely asked whether the law prevented
burdens from being imposed on other citizens.
The SCC found that the law did prevent burdens for many
citizens. Based on the fact that courts in modem Egypt were
backlogged, the SCC reasoned that courts often fail to order child
support in a timely manner." This meant that guardians would not be
reimbursed for legitimate expenses incurred through no fault of their
own, unless courts could order retroactive child support. Thus, any ban
on retroactive child support would create unjustifiable burdens for
innocent guardians.78
Ultimately, the Court seems to have performed a balancing test
without weighing both sides. It decided that no matter what burdens
were caused by the grant of retroactive child support, they would be
outweighed by the benefits that such a law provided for needy mothers.
In short, the Court's failure to perform a systematic policy analysis
ultimately left a raft of unanswered questions for observers or other
courts to puzzle through: How should courts measure hardship or
pleasure? How much more pain than pleasure must a law cause before
it becomes unconstitutional? Should a court defer at all to the findings
of another branch of government-particularly the branch that passed
the controversial law or issued the controversial order?79 It remained to
be seen whether these questions would be answered in later opinions.
3. The 1996 Veil Case
Two years later, in 1996, the SCC decided one of the most
controversial Article 2 cases to reach the SCC, the "Veil Case."8 This
case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an administrative
order rather than a law. The SCC's approach to determining whether
the ban was constitutional, however, followed the model laid down in

77. See Child Support Case, supranote 31, at 112.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 109-12.
80. See Veil Case, supranote 31.
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the 1994 Child Support Case. The SCC continued to define the
fundamental principles of the sharia as extremely broad principles that
were both found in the Qur'an and accepted by all schools of law. Its
analysis, although more thorough than in the Child Support Case, still
fell short of providing a convincing or systematic methodology for
identifying principles and applying them to laws.
The Veil Case involved a challenge to an order issued by the
Minister of Education that prohibited schoolgirls from wearing a
particular type of veil known as the niqab in schools."1 Commonly worn
by women in the conservative societies of the Arabian peninsula, the
niqab veil first became popular in Egypt in the 1970's. Many Egyptians
had become familiar with it while working in the oil fields of Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf At the same time, the increasingly popular Islamists
reminded women that the sharia required women to "cover themselves."
Islamist women-as well as women who were not involved with Islamist
groups-began to adopt the niqab or its slightly less restrictive cousin,
the hiab.82 By the 1980's, the niqab and hijab had come to be widely
recognized symbols of Islamism. 3
The secularist Egyptian government was hostile to both the hiyab
and niqab, and it occasionally proposed banning both garments. In 1994
the Minister of Education issued ministerial edict #113/1994, which
banned the niqab and hyab in all schools below the university level even
though the government had rescinded a similar order due to public
outcry84 and the threat of constitutional litigation. 5
Islamist lawyers promptly brought Article 2 challenges to the

81. The niqab is in one of many different types of "veil" worn in the Middle East. It

covers a woman's hair and the whole of her face below the eyes. Although the niqab is the
archetypal "veil" in the minds of most Westerners, it is not traditional in Egypt, where women
have traditionally covered their heads with scarves tied behind their head or scarves tied under
their chin. See generallyANDREAB. RUGH, REVEAL AND CONCEAL: DRESS IN CONTEMPORARY
EGYPT.
82. See id. at 150.
83. See Said Ashmawy, The Veil in EgyptianLaw and Islam, MIDDLE EAST TIMEs, Oct.
19-25, 1993, at 3; RUGH, supranote 8, at 149.
84. The public resented the ban. As Egyptian society had grown more conservative,

veiling among schoolgirls had become the norm in many places. Newspapers estimated that
75% of schoolgirls wore either the niqab or hijab at the time. See Middle East Times Staff,
Court Throws Out Veil Ban, MIDDLE EAST TuMas, Apr. 9, 1994.
85. For the text ofthe edict, see Veil Case, supranote 31, at 1029-30. The anti-Islamist
purpose of the legislation was made abundantly clear by the Education Minister when he

explained the reasons for the ban to journalists. The ban was designed to show, he said, that
"we will not let Egypts schools become a well of extremism and terrorism." See Yasmine
Abou el-Kheir, School Girls Unveiled Without Consent, MIDDLE EAST TnIms, Aug. 1, 1994,
at 1.
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edict.86 Alarmed by the popular reaction to the decree, the Minister of
Education softened it. He issued a new edict (#208/1994) which
amended the earlier edict.87 Under the new edict, schoolgirls could wear
the hijab if they received permission from their parents. Plaintiffs,
however, continued to fight the decrees in court and the court of first
instance struck down the order as a violation of Article 2.88 With the
issue becoming something of a cause celebre in Egypt, the Appeals
Court of Alexandria heard an appeal, enjoined enforcement of the
decree, and asked the SCC to determine whether the order violated
Article 2 of the Constitution. The SCC heard the Veil Case on May 18,
1996.
The SCC analyzed the law using the same basic approach that it
had used in the 1994 Child Support Case. 9 The SCC first asked if the
Qur'an or sunna contained passages specifically commanding women to
cover their hair and faces. By looking to the sunna, the SCC corrected
an oversight in the 1994 case.9" The SCC first identified two passages
of the Qur'an which require women to cover up those parts of their body
that are sexually appealing to men, but it found none that specifically
required women to cover their hair or their faces. Q: 24:31 states that
women must "display of their adornment [zinat] only that which is
apparent, and draw their veils over their bosoms.., and not stamp their
feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornment."'
Q: 33:59 requires women to "draw their cloaks close round them (when
they go abroad)."' The SCC looked to the plain meaning of these texts
and found that they do not require women to wear a veil over their hair
or face. Rather, they stand for the general proposition that women must
cover some parts of their body. Similarly, the SCC could find no
evidence in the sunna that God wanted women had to cover their hair or

86. See Abou el-Kheir, supranote 85, at 1.
87. See Veil Case, supranote 31, at 1027-30.
88. See Court Throws Out Veil Ban, MIDDLE EAST TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1994, at 1.
89. The court also addressed a second challenge to the edicts, which I will not go into
here at length. The plaintiff claimed that the edicts violated Article 46 of the Constitution
which guarantees the right to freedom of belief and freedom of religious practice. The court
held that it did not. See Veil Case, supra note 31, at 1038-40.
90. See Child Support Case, supra note 31, and accompanying text.
91. See THEHOLYQuRA'N, supra note 75, at 873-74; PICKTHALL, supra note 75, at 255.
It is worth looking at the verses to see how the SCC edited them. It chose to excise passages
that would seem to require greater covering than the ones cited above.
92. See THE HOLY QuR'AN, supranote 75, at 1077; PICKTHALL, supra note 75, at 306.
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faces.' In the sunna literature, there were reports that the Prophet had
asked women to cover everything but their heads and faces. But, said
the SCC, there was no evidence that the Prophet had required some
women to wear the hiab or niqab. Since there was no clear declaration
in the Qur'an or sunna that women must wear the hijab or niqab, the
SCC declared itself fairly certain that the sharia did not specifically
require women to wear the veil. It wrote:
Considering [however] that the exact description of
women's attire is not regulated by unambiguous religious
texts, the way a woman should dress must be considered
one of the controversial issues on which legislation
[ijtihad] never stops. This issue is one on which
legislation [ijtihad] is always open, at least within the
framework of the rules set by the Qur'an verses...."
This tentative conclusion was confirmed by the fact that various
schools of sharia disagreed on whether women must wear the niqab.9s
The SCC found that some scholars of Islamic law had stated that women
must cover their faces. Many others, however, stated that this was not
obligatory. 96 This disagreement proved conclusively that there was no
fundamental principle of sharia that required women to wear a veil over
their face. 97
The SCC's analysis improved on its prior effort in the 1994 Child
Support Case. Its analysis of the Qur'an and sunna, and of the opinions
of the schools, seemed more thorough than before. The Court cited
93. See Veil Case, supranote 31, at 1037. The 8CC cited the sunna for the proposition
that the Prophet commanded a woman to cover everything but her face and hands. It is clear
that the SCC interpreted this passage to describe not a rule to be followed literally, but rather
an application of the principle that women must dress modestly. This is because the 8CC
declares that the principle that women must dress modestly can be applied in a much less
restrictive way.
94. The SCC also said, "Therefore, women's attire will not be considered one of the
completely fundamental, immutable points of law, and the legal authorities have full authority
to legislate on this issue (of veiling) by issuing practical rules which apply to it. The legal
authorities can prescribe the attire which will be right for the people according to any custom
and tradition so long as it does not violate unambiguous [passages from the religious] texts."
Veil Case, supra note 31, at 1035.
95. See id. at 1037.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1032. "[Laws of sharia] on which there are still differences of opinion do
not have binding force over those who do not ascribe to them. Consequently, they cannot be
considered fixed, established, immutable law .. "
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more schools of law, and mentioned some of the scholars by name.98
Nevertheless, one should note, it still did not look at the writings of all
the schools nor did it examine them in any detail. Furthermore, it failed
to cite the source of its information about the position of the schools.
Since there was no specific fundamental principle of sharia that
required women to wear the niqab, the SCC determined that the
minister's ban violated no specific fundamental principle of sharia. The
SCC then asked whether the ban conflicted with any broad, fundamental
principles of the sharia. The SCC identified two fundamental principles
of possible relevance, and evaluated whether the veil ban violated them.
The SCC first identified the fundamental principle that women
must dress modestly. The SCC insisted that all Muslims have tried to
heed the fundamental Qur'anic principle laid down in Q: 24:31 and Q:
33:59. All have agreed that women must cover up those parts of her
body that are inherently sexy according to the standards of her culture.99
The competing schools had disagreed as to whether a woman must wear
a veil over her face, because they disagreed on what parts of a woman's
body were 'aurat-orinhereitly sexual."' 0 The SCC explains:
The Islamic legal scholars have had differences of
opinion when interpreting the Qur'anic texts and the
sahih or daif sayings of the prophet. These differences
include differences over the proper attire for a woman
and over what parts of her body should be covered.
[However,] consideration of the essence of the
provisions of the Islamic sharia reveals that the sharia
-insofar as it puts restrictions on women's dress-tries
to elevate women in society .... This order means a
woman should rise above all things that might sully her
or insult her, especially through her attire, or manner of
speech, or manner of walking, or through revealing her
womanly form so as to seduce someone, or by showing
98. See id. at 1037.
99. See id. at 1035-36.
100. The meaning of the term 'auratis ambiguous in the Qur'an. In the Qur'an and

traditional Islamic legal texts it refers generally to "that which should not be seen." In many
of these cases it seems to be that which is sexual which must not be seen. See Q: 24:3 1, THE
HOLY QURAN supranote 75, at 874. In Yusuf's facing translation English translation, he
translates 'auratidiosyncratically and extremely prudishly as "the shame of sex." For a more
widely used English translation, See PIcKTHALL, supra note 75, at 255, where he translates
"auratas "nakedness." In modem Arabic, the term has come to mean a deficiency, or genitals.
See A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRrrrEN ARABIC, supranote 19, at 656.
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her 'aurat. According to sharia, the right of a woman to
choose her style of dress is limited. She cannot merely
choose according to what she pleases. The way that a
woman looks should express her modesty in a way that
will permit her legally to do what she needs to do in life,
and which simultaneously keeps her away from that
indecency/immorality (ibtiza) which arises when men
approach her because of the way her body looks and
which leads her to sin (ithm) and affects her position and
situation. 101
The question then was whether the niqab ban promoted
immodest behavior in opposition to the fundamental principle that
women must dress modestly. The SCC evaluated the ban by focusing on
what ends the principles of modesty are to serve. The SCC found that
modesty is, at its heart, designed to prevent illicit sex. Thus, clothing is
modest so long as it does not promote illicit sex. This led the SCC into
another balancing test, from which it concluded that being unveiled is not
unconstitutionally "immodest." The SCC never really explained what
factors they considered to determine whether or not clothing will lead to
more illicit sex (and is thus "immodest"). In some ways, the SCC's
decision seemed to reflect nothing more than the judges' own personal
values of what is and is not improper. Based on its unsubstantiated
belief that walking about unveiled does not lead to any more illicit sex
than walking about veiled, the SCC determined that it is not immodest
for women to walk about with their hair and faces uncovered. 2
Then the SCC, in dicta, came to a conclusion that it did not
explain at all. It stated in passing that it would be unconstitutional to
allow schoolgirls to wear a skirt that rose above the ankles.
[L]egislation must not contradict the general spirit of the
sharia.
The general spirit of the sharia is not
contradicted so long as woman's clothes do not show
her 'aurat,or her legs, and do not reveal too much of her

101. Veil Case, supra note 31, at 1035-37.
102. 'Making it obligatory for women to cover their faces, hands, and even, according to
some, the feet, could not be an acceptable interpretation.... [E]xposing her face helps her
to be in contact with different people who know her. This actually promotes supervision of
her behavior, and it is therefore more protective of her virtue ['hiya1,preserves her
psychological health, and keeps her from being stigmatized." Id. at 1037.
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body.103
The principle that women must dress modestly was not the only
fundamental principle that the SCC evaluated when considering the
constitutionality of the niqab ban. The SCC also evaluated the niqab
ban to see whether it violated the fundamental principle that no law may
create unjustifiable burdens on people. The SCC had already announced
this principle in the Child Support Case." 4 Thus, in this case, it did not
derive it anew, but merely evaluated whether the veil ban violated the
principle.
In evaluating whether the veil ban was unconstitutionally
burdensome, the SCC's analysis was similar to the one it performed in
the Child Support Case. It examined the burdensomeness of the law by
performing a utilitarian analysis without providing any evidence for some
of its basic assumptions. Without citing any psychological studies in its
favor, it insisted that wearing the niqab or hyjab creates a psychological
burden for schoolgirls, and naturally, banning the veil prevented these
harms. The SCC then weighed this benefit against the social harm that
is caused by forcing women to reveal their faces. According to the SCC,
the veil serves two socially beneficial purposes. First, it prevents men
and women from being discomfitted by the lustful stares of men and it
prevents illicit sex that arises naturally when men lust after a pretty
woman. The SCC concluded that the benefits of being unveiled
outweighs the burden. Being unveiled "is more protective of her virtue
(hiya'), preserves her psychological health, and keeps her from being
stigmatized."'0 5 Furthermore, as discussed above, the SCC insists that
going about unveiled does not lead to illicit sex. Thus, a ban on veils
does not create unjustifiable burdens on Muslim society. Since the SCC
did not find any fundamental principle mandating veils, nor did it violate
any of the fundamental principles that the SCC did identify, the veil ban
did not violate the sharia and was constitutional.
In short, in the 1996 Veil Case the SCC continued to follow the
framework laid down in the 1994 Child Support Case. According to the
103. Id. at 1038.
104. The SCC does not repeat the Qur'anic verse here. It does stress, however, that
according to Muslim tradition, the companions of the Prophet and the classical scholars of
Islam themselves employed utilitarian considerations when making rules. "[T]he companions
of the Prophet and the mujtahids often issued rulings on the basis of the interests of the
faithful, seeking the good of the faithful and protecting them from any harm that might befall
them. They did this by considering how the interests of the faithful develop/change/evolve
according to changing circumstances in society." Id. at 1034.
105. Id. at 1037.
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Court, Article 2 only requires the Egyptian government to respect a
small body of broad principles that were laid down in the Qur'an and
sunna and have been accepted by all schools of sharia. When evaluating
an Egyptian law for conformity with the fundamental principles of
Islamic law, the SCC conducted a two-step process. It identified the
fundamental principles of Islam that may be relevant to the law in
question. It then determined conformity.
To identify the fundamental principles of Islam, the SCC
analyzed the Qur'an, sunna and the writings of the schools. The
fundamental principles are extremely broad principles capable of being
interpreted and applied in any number of ways. To examine whether or
not the law in question violated any of the fundamental principles, the
SCC performs a utilitarian analysis. It extrapolates from the principles
a putative social goal. It then determines whether the law in question
promotes or hinders that goal. Such an analysis would seem to turn
ultimately on subjective policy judgements. In these cases, the SCC gave
little indication of how courts could evaluate legislation in an objective
way. It weighed the social good of Egyptian legislation against the
social harm without citing any objective data to support its conclusions.

I. A Critique of the SCC's Current Article 2 Doctrine
Having described the SCC's Article 2 jurisprudence to date, it is
now possible to evaluate it. We must ask ourselves what legal and
political problems it is designed to address and whether it will actually
solve these problems. The Court's Article 2 jurisprudence is designed
to "Islamize" Egyptian law in a manner that satisfies both Islamists and
secularists. I propose that in its current form, the SCC will not achieve
this goal. With some changes in its approach, however, the SCC
doctrine may be able to do so.
To understand and evaluate the SCC's doctrine, we must first
examine it in light of the difficult political situation in which the Court,
along with all of Egypt, has found itself. For the past twenty years,
Egypt has been in a state of near-civil war between secularists, who
include most members of the government party, and Islamists, who enjoy
considerable support among the Egyptian people.
The government of Egypt agreed to the amendment of Article 2
in 1980 as a concession to Islamists. Shortly thereafter, though, the
government refused to voluntarily rewrite its law. Enforcement of
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Article 2 would have to come from the courts. In the meantime, the
government began to crack down on Islamists. As a result of the
political repression, Islamists were largely shut out of the legislative and
political branches. Some Islamists responded by turning to violence.
Others turned to the courts. Because of this crisis, the SCC was
ultimately forced to interpret Article 2. By declaring Article 2 to be nonretroactive, it postponed its entry into the battle between Islamists and
secularists. In 1993, however, the Court was compelled to define what
it meant for new Egyptian legislation to conform to sharia and to find a
method of measuring that conformity.
Since 1993, the SCC has tried to interpret Article 2 in such a way
that it will provide a legal solution to the battle between secularists and
Islamists-a compromise that would satisfy Islamists by guaranteeing the
Islamic nature of the law, and also satisfy secularists by guaranteeing the
flexibility of the law. At first glance, the SCC's doctrine seems an
ingenious solution that might actually achieve this goal. Indeed, some
observers are very optimistic about it. To the best of my knowledge,
outside of this note there has been only one short article in a Western
language analyzing and evaluating the court's jurisprudence up to 1994.
The author of this work is a prominent Egyptian expert on the SCC, and
he is extremely optimistic that the Court's doctrine will satisfy both
Islamists and secularists. The Court's theory of sharia, he argues, cannot
fail to be recognized as a coherent and convincing approach to deriving
Islamic law. Yet it also, he claims, guarantees that the law will remain
flexible and progressive. It has, he states, "dispelled the widely held
view that the Islamic sharia represented a codified, inflexible set of rules
that applied to Moslems in all circumstances and acted as a retrograde
brake on the future development of Moslem states." Rather, the SCC's
opinions demonstrated that Islamic governments could "enact
progressive legislation ...while remaining fully compatible with the
requirements of the Islamic religion."106
I suggest that this conclusion may be too optimistic. While the
SCC's doctrine is an impressive start towards a compromise between
Islamists and secularists, it is only a beginning. Unless the SCC further
refines and clarifies its doctrine, the doctrine will not be able to legitimize
Egyptian law for Islamists, nor will it be able to guarantee that the law
will remain progressive and flexible in the long term.

106. Gabr, supra note 9, at 227.
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A. Islamists Will Not NecessarilyAccept the SCC 's Theory in Its
CurrentForm Because the SCC HasNot Explained Why CivilJudges
Are Qualifiedto Interpretthe Law.
Although the SCC has presented a compelling definition of
sharia, it has not made a serious attempt to demonstrate that civil judges
are capable of carrying out the interpretation of Qur'an, sunna, and
traditional legal texts required to apply the SCC's definition of sharia.
Unless the SCC can both argue for the competence of judges and
demonstrate its own competence, Islamists will not accept the SCC's
interpretations of sharia.
The SCC has championed a definition of Islamic law as general
principles designed to serve divinely sanctioned social goals. This is a
definition that should appeal to Islamists. As mentioned above, the idea
that the sharia is determined by applying broad principles rather than by
analogy from specific rules is untraditional, but it has been embraced by
many contemporary Islamists over the past one hundred years. Many
influential Islamists have also embraced the notion that the sharia is
ultimately designed to promote certain divinely favoured social goals,
such as increased chastity in society. Islamists may well be willing to
accept the SCC's definition of sharia as a body of general fundamental
principles, and they may well accept that these principles can be
interpreted and applied differently over time.7
Nevertheless, Islamists and the SCC will disagree on the question
of who may identify, interpret, and apply the fundamental principles of
sharia. The SCC assumes that civil judges can define what is in keeping
with sharia for the purposes of Article 2, but Islamists may question and
ultimately reject the judges' ability and right to interpret and apply the
principles of Islam. And they may point to the SCC's own opinions to
prove that civil judges cannot be trusted to perform the analyses the
SCC's doctrine ultimately requires of them.
Islamists generally insist that only professional Islamic scholars
can properly identify and apply the principles of the sharia. Such
scholars alone have the training required to interpret properly the Qur'an
and sunna. Only trained scholars have sufficient familiarity with the
competing opinions within the classical Islamic legal tradition to
107. Furthermore, one should note that Islanists will almost surely accept one of the
principles that has been identified by the SCC as a fundamental principle of Islam. The
principle that all laws should lead to the utilitarian benefit of the Muslim community was

explored by Qutb and proclaimed explicitly by other leading contemporary Islamist ideologues
such as Hasan Turabi.
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understand what principles have been implicitly accepted by all schools.
Thus, some Islamists insist that the SCC and the courts are not capable
of carrying out the tasks that it itself has said are necessary to apply
sharia properly in society.
Some Egyptian Islamists have refused to give civil judges any
role in formulating an Islamic law for Egypt. For such thinkers, civil
judges are not only incompetent to administer the law, but they are not
sufficiently independent of the government. Only professional Islamic
scholars have the intelligence and moral authority to stand up to a
powerful and manipulative government." 8 Even so, not all Egyptian
Islamists have been so emphatic. Some say that the courts can perform
the initial determination of whether a law conformed to the dictates of
sharia, but such a decision, including one by the SCC, must be reviewed
by Islamic scholars. One proposal by an Egyptian law professor would
allow the SCC to be overruled by the unanimous vote of independent,
classically-trained scholars." 9 Still other influential Islamists seem to
have accepted that civil judges can interpret and apply sharia so long as
they receive substantial training in Islamic law to match their training in
civil law. 10
The SCC, I suggest, must recognize the seriousness of these
criticisms and work to demonstrate to moderate Islamists that it does
have sufficient training in Islamic law. The SCC has not yet
demonstrated a convincing familiarity with the texts that it claims to be
interpreting. The Court's apparent lack of expertise can only hinder the
acceptance of its doctrine and decisions. In the discussion of the Child
Support and Veil opinions, the SCC cut comers when it derived
fundamental principles. It has tried to interpret the Qur'an and sunna on
the basis of plain meaning, something Islamic legal scholars have never
considered acceptable. In the Child Support Case, it did not look at the
sunna for evidence of any fundamental principles. In the Veil Case it
looked to the sunna, but did not give a full discussion of how it was
using the evidence. Furthermore, the SCC's interpretations of the
Qur'an are supposed to be validated by the agreement of the schools.
However, the opinions so far have not demonstrated wide familiarity

108. See the manifesto ofthe Islamic (Student) Association of Cairo University, reprinted

in ISLAM IN TRANSIToN, supra note 13.
109. See 'ABD AL NASR TAwFIQ AL-'ATTAR, AL-'UsRAT WA QANUN AL-AHWAL
ALSHAKSnYYA

17 -18 (1985).

110. Thus, in the 1970's the influential sheikh of al-Azhar insisted that no court could
constitutionally enforce the sharia so long as Egyptian law schools gave only token instruction
in Islamic law, but he left open the possiblity that with more training the law could be applied
by such judges. See al-Halim Mahmud, supranote 13, at 231.
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with the competing rules of the schools. The Court is usually content to
mention rules from a few schools and it rarely cites the text from which
they took that law.11' Moreover, in their academic research and writing,
the justices of the SCC do not seem to have sought extra training in
Islamic law-choosing instead to expand upon their extensive
knowledge of international and comparative law." 2
By not explicitly addressing the question of its competence in its
opinions, and by interpreting the law in a haphazard manner, the Court
has left itself open to attack by demagogic Islamists who assert that the
judges are manipulating the Qur'an, sunna and legal tradition to suit its
own secularist ends. The claim that the SCC is manipulating the Word
of God is, of course, a more inflammatory claim than the claim that it is
merely ignoring Islamists. The SCC must, therefore, act quickly to
forestall them. It must expand its discussions to explain explicitly why
civil court judges are capable of sufficiently sophisticated analysis. It
must also make a point to show in its own opinions that the judges of the
SCC themselves have a sophisticated grasp of the sacred texts of Islam
and the traditions of Islamic law. If it can do these things, it may satisfy
moderate Islamists. This will be a great step towards obtaining its
acceptance by Egyptians as a whole. If it does not do these things the
SCC runs the risk of alienating many Egyptians.
In short, to validate its theory in general, and, as a political
matter, to establish its legitimacy as an interpreters of sharia, the SCC
must take two steps. It should explain explicitly why it believes sharia
can be interpreted and applied by civil judges, and it must begin to

111. One might also add that, in interpreting Qur'anic verses, the SCC seemed to look to
their plain meaning as if it was unaware of the multitudinous Qur'anic commentaries (tafsir)
that are so important to traditional Muslim interpretation. When they refer to a tradition from
the sunna literature, the justices do not discuss hadith criticism.
112. The curriculaevitae of two judges have been published in a book about the SCC.
Each has taken advanced degrees or fellowships in international law, human rights, or
admiralty. Neither, however, seems to have taken any degree or training in Islamic law.
Furthermore, in their scholarly writing they do not show deep concern with the nuances of
Islamic legal interpretation. This is evident in academic articles and speeches, such as the one
recently published by the Chief Justice of the SCC. See Dr. Awad el-Mort, Human Rights in
the Constitutional Systems of Egypt and Other Islamic Countries: International and
ComparativeStandardsin HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY, supranote 5, at 161-215. This
work devotes some space to the subject of Islamic law and its compatibility with modem
theories of human rights. In so doing, it discusses American constitutional law and
international law with a great deal of sophistication and cites a large number of American and
international legal opinions and secondary sources. It mentions forty-five opinions from the
U.S. Supreme Court as well as a great number of international covenants and World Court
cases. It does not show a corresponding familiarity with Islamic legal tradition. Its discussion
of Islamic legal principles is very general, and in the article, it cites only one work on the
subject of Islamic law.
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display more familiarity with the texts and methods of Islamic law.
B. The SCC's Theory Does Not Guaranteethat the Legislature
Will Continue to Be Able to PassProgressiveLaws.
Assuming that Egyptians will accept the authority of civil judges
to interpret and define the sharia, there is a second potential problem to
the successful application of the SCC's method: the SCC's theory does
not guarantee that the law will be progressive. Although it claims to be
a bulwark against doctrinaire interpretation of Islamic law, it could easily
be co-opted by Islamists who wish to impose reactionary laws.
The method that the SCC uses to evaluate conformity with the
fundamental principles of sharia has some inherent weaknesses. The
SCC's approach first requires that a policy goal be distilled from each of
the fundamental principles. For instance, the principle that no law should
be burdensome is designed to promote happiness. The principle that
women should dress modestly is designed to promote chastity. Having
identified the goals of sharia legislation, judges must look to see whether
the law in question hinders the achievement of this goal. A law that
creates more unhappiness then happiness would be unconstitutional, as
would a law that promotes unchaste behaviour. It is difficult for judges
to perform the requisite analysis without resorting to inherently
subjective judgements about the nature of happiness or chastity.
Additionally, Article 2 doctrine requires them to evaluate the likely
outcome of legislation-a process that requires them to resort to
unverifiable speculation. In its current form, the SCC's doctrine allows
judges to uphold or strike down laws based ultimately on their own
subjective values.
The justices of the Court have not proposed any way to limit
judicial discretion in Article 2 cases so as to ensure that the principles
will be applied in a progressive manner, or even a consistent manner, in
the future. While they may be convinced that going about unveiled does
not promote unchaste behavior, another judge might feel that it clearly
does and be able to cite new "evidence" to bolster his case. Thus, the
very flexibility of the SCC's doctrine-which was designed to guarantee
the survival of progressive legislation-may be a double-edged sword.
Its broad principles, such as modesty, may well be used in the future by
conservative Islamist judges to strike down laws. Thus far, judicial
discretion has been exercised in favor of a progressive, modem vision of
society, since the current justices are extremely progressive. In the six
Article 2 cases so far, they have never overturned a law solely on the
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ground that it violated Article 2.1" Nevertheless, as the composition of
the SCC changes, it is unclear how Article 2 will be interpreted in the
coming years.
While the Egyptian judiciary is not about to take a reactionary
turn in the near future, the judiciary in Egypt is steadily becoming more
conservative. Quite a few lower court judges are now Islamists, and
Islamist influence is appearing in appeals courts as well." 4 Lower court
judges have handed down Islamist decisions declaring secularists to be
apostates." 5 If Islamist influence continues to spread into the upper
reaches of the judiciary, it is entirely possible that Article 2 doctrine will
some day be interpreted in a reactionary manner. Judges might no
longer defer to the legislature's opinion that a particular act is sufficiently
fair, or that it will lead down the road to greater happiness for citizens,
or that it will promote chastity. Rather, they might strike down laws that
do not conform to a more traditional view of "happiness" or "chastity."
If the SCC really wishes its jurisprudence to satisfy Islamists and
remain progressive, it must further develop its theory in order to limit the
range ofjudicial interpretation or, at least, the pace of potential change.
The Court could do this in two ways. First, it could begin to give more
specific instructions to the judiciary on how to interpret and apply the

113. One should be aware, however, that in Law No. 136 Case, the SCC overturned the
statute on the grounds that it violated Article 7 of the Constitution. In dicta, and without
elaboration, the SCC stated that the law also violated Articles 32, 34 and 2. See Law No. 136
Case, supranote 31, at 278-80.
114. See, e.g., Mary Anne Weaver, Letterfrom Cairo,NEW YoRKER at 38,41-44 (June
8, 1998). One should consult this article with caution. It misstates several Egyptian laws and
is marred by an alarmist tone. Nevertheless, its discussion of Islamists in the judiciary is
instructive. Weaver fails to give the background of this phenomenon. The rise of Islamism
among lawyers and judges in Egypt is part of a larger phenomenon of the rise of Islamism in
the professions generally. Sociologists have noted the relationship of Islamism to the
expansion of university education to a greater number of people without an expansion of the
job base. On this point see, for example, SwvA, supranote 3, at 126-27; KEPEL, supranote
12, at 135-46, 235. As university education became accessible to more Egyptians, the
membership of the bar began to include a greater number of people from geographic areas and
social classes which had traditionally been excluded from elite professions. See KEPEL, supra
note 12, at 135-38; SwAN, supra note 3, at 126-27. The expansion of the Egyptian legal
profession to include members of traditionally underrepresented classes had two effects. First,
it opened the bar to people who came from less affluent and less westernized segments of
society. These lawyers and judges were less inclined to assume that law had to be based on
a secularist model of the state. See generally Eric Davis, Ideology, Social Class andIslamic
Radicalism in Modern Egypt in FROM NATIONALISM TO REVOLUTIONARY ISLAM 134, 140-45
(Said Amir Arjomand ed., 1984). Second, it opened the bar to people who were suffering
under economic pressures and who therefore were attracted to Islamist critiques of the
government as corrupt. Islamists made great inroads into the bar and from there into the
judiciary.
115. See Weaver, supranote 114, at 38-40.
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principles that have already been judicially considered. It could, in short,
instruct judges to interpret the laws progressively. Such an approach,
however, would be ill-advised, since it would outrage Islamists and
might drive them from the courts.
Far better would be to come up with some standard of deference
which all judges will be expected to show to the legislative and executive
branches, when examining whether laws are appropriately Islamic. Such
a step would have the effect of limiting the role of judges in the
Islamization debate and of promoting liberal, progressive legislation,
without the judges actually choosing sides in the debate. I would
propose that the SCC require deference to legislation in the way that the
U.S. Supreme Court required some degree of deference to administrative
rule making in Chevron."6
According to the SCC, Article 2 commands the Egyptian
government to obey principles that advance certain noble social goals.
Any number of laws could thus be said to conform to sharia, just as any
number of administrative regulations could, arguably, be said to conform
to the statute that creates an administrative agency. In Chevron, the
U.S. Supreme Court said that in evaluating an administrative rule, courts
must go through a two-step process: it must make sure that legislation
does not violate the explicit command of the statute that created and
governs the agency."' If the rule does not violate the legislative
command on its face, the court will examine whether the rule is
reasonable in light of the legislative command. In most cases, a court is
required not to overturn laws that resulted from a reasonable
interpretation of the administrative statute-even if it feels that the
agency's interpretation is not the best one. Only in special circumstances
is it asked to take a "hard look" at an agency's interpretation of the
underlying statute.
I would suggest that the SCC lay down a similar doctrine. It
already performs the first step of the Chevron analysis. It examines
whether legislation violates the explicit command of the sharia by
checking to see whether there is a fundamental principle of sharia
directly on point. I would propose that the Court explicitly state that it
will not overturn any law if a reasonable person could believe that such
a law would be in keeping with the fundamental principles of sharia.
116. See Chevron, U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
117. See id. at 847-52.
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Judges must not overturn the law merely on the grounds that they would
interpret and apply the fundamental principles of sharia differently.
Perhaps in some cases the SCC would have to take a "hard look" at
legislation. It could carve out certain areas that require more judicial
oversight. Perhaps these would include family law issues because
Islamists tend to be so sensitive about them. Perhaps they would include
women's rights or minority rights because traditional Islamic law
occasionally denied rights in these areas that have come to be taken for
granted.
In summary, the SCC's doctrine is designed to reconcile Islamists
to a progressive and flexible legal system presided over by civil courts.
It seems unlikely that the doctrine can, in its present form, achieve this
difficult task. The doctrine may either be rejected entirely by Islamists,
who do not believe that civil judges have the authority to derive and
interpret Islamic legal principles. Or the doctrine may be coopted by
Islamist judges and used to serve inflexible, unprogressive ends. If the
theory is to have any chance of succeeding, the SCC must demonstrate
that civil judges have the ability to perform the requisite analyses. The
SCC must also limit the discretion ofjudges.

IV. Conclusion
In its Article 2 jurisprudence, the SCC has taken a daring step.
Drawn into a pitched political dispute between Islamists and secularists,
the Court has tried to fashion a compromise. It has adapted the work of
innovative thinkers in Islamic history and has come up with its own
theory of sharia. The SCC has tried to create a theory of sharia that
draws upon widely-held notions of the nature of sharia, but that is
flexible enough to accommodate modem notions of human rights and
modem economic institutions.
The 1994 Child Support Case and the 1996 Veil Case illustrate
well the SCC's current Article 2 jurisprudence. According to the SCC,
the sharia is, for all practical purposes, a body of broad "fundamental
principles" that have been revealed in the Qur'an and sunna. These are
designed to promote certain socially useful (and divinely ordained) goals.
They have been implicitly accepted by all schools of law over the years.
The fundamental principles are to be distinguished from the
various bodies of specific rules that have in the past been proposed as
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sharia by competing schools of Islamic law. The rules of the schools
represent attempts to apply the general principles. The Egyptian
government has the right to apply the principles in its own fashion, as it
believes to be appropriate in a modem world. The courts will overturn
legislation only if the overarching principles are not being respected.
The SCC's definition of sharia could, perhaps, be the basis for a
progressive doctrine of sharia that would be widely perceived as
legitimate. There are, however, two weaknesses with the Court's
jurisprudence so far. One weakness rests in the untraditional nature of
the Court's claim that judges trained in civil law are inherently qualified
to identify and apply these principles. It is not clear whether the
Egyptian public will be willing to endorse the judiciary's claim to
interpretive authority in questions of sharia. So far, the SCC has not
convincingly shown that it and other civil judges are trained sufficiently
well in Islamic law to command respect. The SCC must therefore try to
demonstrate greater familiarity with the Qur'an, sunna and texts of the
legal schools. If the public does not accept judges as interpreters of
sharia, then the SCC's doctrine will not be able to unite the nation in the
face of the competing demands of secularists and Islamists.
A second weakness is rooted in the inherent malleability of the
fundamental principles that the SCC has identified. These principles tend
to be so broad and vague that judges can plausibly declare almost any
law to be in conformity with the sharia or in violation of the sharia. If
Islamists continue to occupy more positions in the judiciary, the Court's
doctrine may be used against secularists. The court must limit the
interpretive flexibility of judges. Ideally, it would come up with a
doctrine of limited deference to the legislative interpretation of the
sharia. If it does not do so, the Court's doctrine will never be able to
guarantee that Article 2 will permit flexible or progressive jurisprudence.
In short, the SCC must come up with a way to convince both
secularists and Islamists that the SCC's jurisprudence is more than a tool
with which judges will identify their own values as higher principles of
Islamic law. It may be difficult, but the potential rewards are great for
both Egypt and the larger Muslim world. As noted in the introduction,
many Muslim nations have chosen to constitutionalize the sharia. Each
of these governments is struggling to determine how to assert the
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primacy of the sharia in a way that will allow society to develop in a
progressive and flexible fashion.
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